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ABSTRACT
The Internet is comprised of many autonomous systems (AS) man-
aged by independent entities that use the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) to route their traffic. Although it is the de facto standard for
establishing paths across the Internet, BGP is not a secure proto-
col and the Internet infrastructure often experiences attacks, such
as prefix hijacking and attribute mangling, incurring great costs
to ASes that experience them. Various solutions have been pro-
posed in response to these attacks, such as Secure BGP, but they
do not address traffic attraction attacks that stem from export pol-
icy violations. In these attacks, malicious ASes can introduce paths
that are legitimate from the protocol standpoint and yet malicious
to the users of that protocol. Although these attacks have been
studied before, no solution has yet been proposed. In this paper,
we thoroughly characterize this set of attacks and propose a very
lightweight and effective scheme to address them. Our scheme re-
quires no manual configuration. We show that even if only a small
fraction of ASes deploy our scheme, the amount of possible attacks
reduces by on order of magnitude.
Keywords: Border gateway protocol (BGP), secure border gate-
way protocol (S-BGP), BGP traffic attraction attacks, economic as-
pects of the Internet, algebra and dynamic network routing
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet consists of thousands of autonomous systems (AS)
managed by independent entities that route their traffic with the
help of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP allows great flexi-
bility in the way networks route packets, and it does not require a
central coordination point for it to work. Unfortunately, the BGP
is not a secure protocol, and the Internet infrastructure experiences
multiple attacks every day costing millions of dollars to companies
and individuals who experience them. Some of the most danger-
ous attacks are prefix hijacking for spam sending activities, prefix
hijacking for denial of service attacks and, as was recently shown
at BlackHat conference, BGP attributes mangling for traffic snoop-
ing. The research community and industry are developing defenses
against such attacks. The most widely discussed holistic solutions
– which are based on Public-Private Key infrastructure – are Secure
BGP [13] and Secure-Origin-BGP (SO-BGP) [17].
Secure BGP and SO-BGP, in principle, solve many of today’s
BGP security issues. SO-BGP requires that each prefix and its
origin be verified either against the central registry or against the
distributed trust database, thus preventing some prefix hijacking at-
tacks. A more comprehensive protocol - Secure BGP - verifies not
only the origin information but also the path it traversed. Thus,
Secure BGP, if deployed, could prevent BGP attacks that use path
mangling. However, unfalsifiable propagation of the routing infor-
mation does not solve all the BGP security problems.
Secure BGP ensures the correctness of the protocol and authen-
ticity of the information in the received updates. No party in a BGP
message-exchange process can alter or omit information about the
Internet path and forward such altered information to its peers.
Thus, as long as the path and the set of attributes are formed accord-
ing to the protocol, the path is going to be accepted at the receiving
router. In this paper we characterize a different set of attacks that
do not rely on attribute mangling. Instead, the attackers abuse the
legitimate Internet Service Provider (ISP) configurations to change
the traffic routing on the Internet.
Attackers can introduce paths that are legitimate from a protocol
standpoint and yet malicious to the users. Assume network in Fig-
ure 1. The malicious AS named Megan can become a transit net-
work for the traffic between customers of Alice and Bob by simply
propagating their prefixes to the appropriate upstreams. Attacker
propagates path Customer-Of-Alice→Alice→Megan to Bob and
propagates Customer-Of-Bob→Bob→Megan to Alice. Providers
Alice and Bob choose the paths announced by the malicious net-
work Megan, since the path to a customer is always preferred over
the path to a peer for business reasons. We call such attack a path
hijacking attack. Path hijacking types of attacks have been studied
before in [14], where Goldberg et al. have shown them to be ef-
fective in attracting significant volumes of traffic. However, to the
best of our knowledge, no solution to path hijacking attacks has yet
been proposed.
The path hijacking attack is very hard to prevent in an automated
way. First, such attack is hard to distinguish from normal behavior.
Alice has no knowledge about the nature of the relation between
Megan and Bob, and therefore announcements from Megan might
be legitimate. Second, such attacks are very easy to conduct. Al-
most any smaller ISP can trick its upstream providers to send it
traffic. Prevention of such attack would require sophisticated fil-
ters that would need to be updated manually with the configuration
changes in client networks.
In this paper we propose a simple and yet effective technique
to prevent path hijacking attacks in an automated way, without in-
stalling sophisticated path filters. We rely on the valley free path
property, first observed by Lixin Gao [5], which states that un-
der normal policy configurations, an advertisement should never go
from a customer to a provider if the advertisement has already tra-
versed a provider→customer link. In our protocol, before sending
path announcements to their customers, the ISPs, label the routes
to indicate that paths have started to propagate toward customers.
Similarly, the ISPs receiving routes from their customers will check
for a label that indicates whether the path ever traversed
a provider→customer link.
In the following section we will explain the threat model under
which we design our protocol in more detail. Section 3 will de-
scribe the theoretical background of the problem, provide an alge-
Figure 1: Valley attack on a peering relation.
braic formulation and a proof of convergence of any protocol that
could address the threats explained in Section 2. Section 4 details
the protocol itself. In Section 5 we evaluation our scheme with re-
spect to partial deployment settings, and we show that the amount
of possible attacks reduces by on order of magnitude even when
only a small fraction of ASes deploy our scheme. We provide a
summary of related work and conclude in sections 6 and section 7
respectively.
2. THREAT MODEL
The network. We assume an Internet scale network where each
autonomous system (AS) is running Secure BGP. Each participat-
ing AS follows through with the default Secure BGP protocol and
ASes that don’t participate in protocol are not considered secure.
BGP is a path vector protocol with explicit trust agreements im-
plemented via BGP sessions. Each network participant is assumed
to forward the updates through the BGP sessions that reflect the
updates received from these sessions as well as its own policy deci-
sions. Secure BGP adds cryptographic elements to the protocol to
secure the updates, so that participants cannot forge the information
received from neighboring ASes.
Under legitimate circumstances there are three types of BGP ses-
sions from the perspective of any AS: (1) connection to provider,
(2) connection to a client, and (3) connection to a peer. Hence, only
two types of connections are possible: (1) connection between a
customer and a provider, and (2) connection between two peers. We
assume that customers pay providers for traffic the provider agrees
to deliver, and that there is no payment exchanged when two peers
connect and deliver each other’s traffic. With this arrangement, the
traffic forwarding policies in our model can be ordered from most
preferred BGP session to the least preferred BGP session. If an AS
has all types of BGP sessions, it will first prefer to send traffic to a
client, because the client is paying for the traffic. If the remote net-
work is not reachable though the client, next that AS will prefer to
send the traffic to a peer, because forwarding such traffic is essen-
tially free. Finally, if the network is not reachable through clients
and peers, that AS will send traffic to a provider.
The attacker. The attacker participates in the Secure BGP pro-
tocol and thus cannot modify the updates which it receives from
its neighbors. As we will observe, no modification to BGP mes-
sages is necessary to conduct export policy attacks. The attacker,
however, can enter into peering agreements with ISPs of its choice,
subject to market and geographical constraints. We equally con-
sider a case where an attacker acquires control over a legitimate
service provider.
Figure 2: Step attack to attract the provider traffic.
Attack vectors. We consider export policy attacks on BGP ses-
sions in the context of man-in-the-middle attacks. As an end net-
work with its own AS number, the attacker network can observe
the traffic originating or terminating at its own network. Further, if
the attacker’s network has legitimate traffic passing through (from
its customers to its providers or peers), then such traffic can also be
observed and, thus, is not considered a threat in our model.
A threat in our model is defined as an ability for an attacker to
exploit weaknesses in legitimate BGP policies and perform man-in-
the-middle traffic snooping attacks on traffic that should otherwise
be unavailable to the attacker. There are three distinct cases of such
attacks.
• Valley attack. Valley attacks occur when an attack has two
connections to providers that peer to each other. In a legit-
imate system use case, traffic belonging to the customers of
each of the providers is exchanged over the peering link as
shown in Figure 1.
Under normal circumstances, customer Megan in Figure 1
would not re-advertise routes received from Alice to Bob. If
such routes are re-advertised, she becomes a transit for both
service providers, incurring the costs of such transit in addi-
tion to the costs of connections to the providers. If Megan,
however, is a malicious actor, she might reap benefits from
such transit traffic by performing information gathering or
spam dissemination. In fact, Megan can easily become a ma-
licious actor by simply forwarding the appropriate announce-
ments to its providers. The providers would select Megan as
their preferred transit choice because of the default weighting
of the routes as described in the beginning of this section.
• Step attack. A step attack can occur when a malicious actor
forwards announcements it received from its provider to its
Figure 3: Step attack to attract the peer traffic.
peer, and when it forwards announcements from its peer to a
provider.
Figure 2 shows the case when an attacker attracts traffic from
a provider to a customer belonging to a peer of the attacker.
As the attacker forwards announcements to its service provider,
the service provider, given that the path the attack provides is
shorter than the one obtained from a legitimate source, con-
verges to an attacker. Note that such an attack will not attract
all traffic, and it will depend on the topology of the Internet.
Figure 3 shows the case when an attacker attracts traffic from
a peer that would otherwise go directly to the provider of that
peer. In this figure, Megan announces the prefix received
from a provider to a peer. Peer Peter recomputes his routing
table and starts forwarding traffic to Megan instead of for-
warding directly to the provider. Notice that despite having
a shorter path to a provider, Peter prefers Megan, because he
does not need to pay for the traffic serviced by Megan.
• Mirroring attack. An attacker can re-announce routes re-
ceived from one peer to another peer, thus becoming a tran-
sit for the traffic between its peers. The attack works well
if peers under attack do not have direct connection between
them. Otherwise, direct connection between such peers would
provide a shorter path than the attacker can introduce.
Aside from actions conducted by malevolent users, we can equally
apply our security protocol to protect against the damage done by
benign users. For example, many of the “attack vectors” described
above can occur due to simple misconfiguration of BGP import-
export policies.
3. THEORETICAL FORMULATION
BGP, and other path vector protocols, consists of rounds; at every
round participants of BGP exchange information with their neigh-
bors regarding reachability of various destinations. At every round,
for any reachable destination of interest, a participant selects a
local-optimal path out of all the paths to that destination that par-
ticipant learned from each of its out-neighbors over the course of
previous rounds. Criteria for optimality here may be as simple as
the number of hops and as complex as a combination of length,
throughput, average delay and reliability. In this paper we do not
assume any particular criteria. We assume that all participants have
well-defined relative preference for paths with the same origin, des-
tination, and optimality criteria that totally orders those paths (e.g.
an AS may be biased to send traffic through specific providers due
to friendly business relations).
One of the basic goals of BGP is to make sure that the path pro-
tocol achieves stability in finite number of rounds–situation where
no route messages are exchanged between nodes when no more
links are added and deleted [7]. Section 3.1 presents BGP as a
policy-based routing protocol, a scenario where violation of poli-
cies may result in protocol divergence, and an algebraic framework
for expressing BGP policies, valleys, and steps, in a formal and
succinct manner. Prevention of valleys and steps is important to
ensure ultimate convergence as well as IP prefix hijacking attacks.
In Section 3.2 we discuss sufficient and necessary properties for
suppression of valleys and steps in BGP in the context of IP prefix
hijacking attacks.
3.1 Convergence of BGP
In BGP every node has either a customer-provider or a peer-to-
peer relationship, exclusively, with its every neighbor, where, re-
gardless of the direction of traffic, in the former relationship money
flows from customer to its provider while in the latter relationship
no money flow takes place. We ignore the sibling relationship be-
cause sibling ASes could be collapsed and treated as single AS.
Policy-based routing makes sense in this context, and it can be
roughly sketched by the properties listed in Table 1. In this Section
we discuss BGP convergence issues with respect to these policies
and express these with algebraic formulation.
3.1.1 Divergence Example
Whether intentionally or unintentionally, when the basic policies
described above are violated, convergence of BGP cannot be guar-
anteed in general [15]. We say that violations of policies 2-4 result
in steps, and we say that the violations of policy 5 result in val-
leys. [16] show a scenario, bad gadget, where independently cho-
sen policies of ASes lead to divergence of BGP. We show a variant
of the bad gadget scenario in Figure 4 as an example of how viola-
tion of policies (as per Table 1) may result in divergence of BGP. In
this example c0, c1, and c2 are customers of P ; c0 and c1 are peers,
c1 and c2 are peers, and c2 and c0 are peers. c0, c1, c2 violate
policy 2 due to a misconfiguration, but no participant violates pol-
icy 1. We do not assume that route advertisements are exchanged
synchronously. Let us consider the execution of BGP presented in
Table 2, where each step represents a single time unit. We see that
the state of this BGP execution at Step 2 is essentially identical to
that of Step 0, which implies that this execution of BGP will cy-
cle forever in clockwise direction. Although no participant in this
example may be malicious (e.g. c0, c1, c2 may have only a miscon-
figuration problem), such scenarios are bad in general because they
require nodes to continuously waste cycles and bandwidth while
processing updates and exchanging route advertisements respec-
tively.
3.1.2 Algebraic Formalization
We will now present a very general algebraic formulation of BGP
as a policy-based path vector routing protocol. Most of the follow-
ing notation and logic were borrowed from [15]. We represent the
algebra of interest with a seven-tuple (W,, L, Σ, φ,⊕, f), where
W is a set of weights totally ordered by the relation, L is a set of
labels, Σ is a set of signatures with a special signature φ that rep-
# policy
1 –paths that start with a provider link (provider paths) are the least preferred while
paths that start with a customer link (customer paths) are the most preferred; paths
that start with peer a link (peer paths) are in the middle
2 –no node exports provider paths to a peer
3 –no node exports peer paths to a provider
4 –no node exports peer paths to a peer
5 –no node exports provider paths to a provider
Table 1: Basic policies for BGP.
# action
Stp 0 –c1 has direct access to P via a provider link, and allows c0 to go through itself
to reach P ; c2 accesses P directly through a provider link and advertises this
access to c1
Stp 1 –c1 switches its access to P to go through c2 and withdraws its transit to P for
c0
Stp 2 –c0 accesses P directly through provider link and advertises this access to c2
Table 2: Step-by-step example of how a BGP execution enters an infinite cycle in a network with steps depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Bad gadget. Given that clients prefer peer on the
left and only direct connectivity is announced to the peers, the
protocol in such setting never converges.
resents a signature of an infinite-weight path. Binary operator ⊕
maps elements of L×Σ to Σ, and the function f maps elements of
Σ to W . This algebra must satisfy the basic axioms of maximality
and absorption: ∀α∈Σ\{φ} f(α) ≺ f(φ), and ∀`∈L ` ⊕ φ = φ
respectively. Network links and paths are represented with labels
and signatures respectively. For instance, label of link (u, v) is rep-
resented with `(u, v). The signature of a path composed of a single
destination node d is represented with s(d), and a signature of any
non-trivial path uv ◦Q, where Q is some already established path,
is defined inductively as: s(uv ◦ Q) = `(u, v) ⊕ s(Q). Here, bi-
nary operator ◦ denotes an extension of a path with a another path
by pre-pending the latter to the former. With this notation we can
denote weight of a path Q by f(s(Q)).
It was shown in [15] that monotonicity is necessary and sufficient
for a path vector protocol to converge to local-optimal paths in-
trees (for every source-destination pair in the network the chosen
path to the destination is minimal in weight for the source), where
monotonicity requires that
∀`∈L and ∀α∈Σ f(α)  f(`⊕ α).
In other words, monotonicity requires that the weight of some path
Q must not decrease when it is prefixed by some other path P :
f(s(Q))  f(s(P ◦ Q)). We see that the non-converging exam-
ple described in Table 2 of this section is a non-monotonic algebra
which we specify below:
L = {c, r, p}, Σ = L ∪ {ε, φ}, W = {0, 1, 2, +∞},
 is ≤,⊕ is defined as
⊕ ε c r p
c c c c c
r r r φ r
p p p p p
where left column represents labels and the first row represents sig-
natures, and f is defined as
f(ε) = 0, f(c) = 1, f(r = 2), f(p) = 3, f(φ) = +∞
where c, r, and p represent customer, peer, and provider links re-
spectively, and ε is the signature of any trivial path. For policy-
based routing with local preferences, the weight of some path P
is defined as f(the first link of P ). We see that this algebra con-
tains no restrictions regarding valleys and and almost no restric-
tions regarding steps: c ⊕ p = c implies that a provider path
can be pre-pended by a customer link resulting in a valley, while
r ⊕ p = r and c ⊕ r = c imply that provider and peer paths can
be pre-pended by peer and customer links respectively resulting in
steps. This is because the total order f(c) < f(r) < f(p) implies
that this algebra satisfies the first point of the policy-based rout-
ing (see Table 1), which says that providers always prefer to send
traffic via their customers or peers, while customers always prefer
to send traffic via peers. Thus, this algebra captures the property
that providers have incentive to participate in valleys by exchang-
ing traffic with peers via their customers rather than through direct
peer links. The only restriction on steps is that r ⊕ r = φ, which
captures the property that peers do not want to provide free transit
from one peer directly to another peer. This algebra is not mono-
tonic: f((c ⊕ r)) = f(c) = 1 < 2 = f(r), and, therefore,
describes a path vector protocol that does not converge.
A simple modification of the ⊕ operator of the above algebra,
while keeping everything else the same, yields a monotonic alge-
bra:
⊕ ε c r p
c c c φ φ
r r r φ φ
p p p p p
simply by disallowing valleys and steps. It is easy to check that
this algebra is monotonic, and, therefore, describes a path vector
protocol that is guaranteed to converge. Because f(φ) = +∞,
c ⊕ p = φ, r ⊕ p = φ and c ⊕ r = φ imply that a provider path
cannot be pre-pended by a customer link, a provider path cannot be
pre-pended by a peer link, a peer path cannot be pre-pended by a
customer link respectively. We see that a real-life BGP implemen-
tation of these restrictions requires that extensions of provider paths
to valleys and extensions of peer, customer, and provider paths to
steps are disallowed (have infinite weight) by the protocol itself or
be highly undesirable. In Section 4 we describe an extension to
BGP that allows for steps and/or valleys to be used as back-up paths
in cases of no other alternatives. This extension is formulated alge-
braically in Section 3.2.
3.2 IP Prefix Highjacking Attacks
Although in the previous section we provided a succinct formu-
lation of the requirements for valley-free and step-free routing de-
cisions that guarantee convergence of BGP, our formulation does
not address the issue of valleys and steps in the face of malicious
behavior. In fact, some instances of valleys and/or steps that are
results of IP prefix highjacking attacks may have no effect on con-
vergence at all. For instance, if at least one customer in Figure 4
is malicious in the sense that it is happy to draw traffic from its
right peer, then convergence is guaranteed because this malicious
customer will not withdraw its transit. Let us consider the attacks
depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
For robustness with respect to link failures, Internet nodes may
engage in backup relationships [6]. We say that a backup path must
contain at least one valley or at least one step, and we call a path
that is free of valleys and steps a primary path. When there are no
primary paths, it is reasonable to allow nodes to use backup paths
that may contain steps and/or valleys, even though such paths are
vulnerable to prefix highjacking attacks. The protocols that allow
for use of backup paths must ensure that backup paths are used only
when there are no available primary paths, and that paths with less
vulnerable regions (steps and valleys) are preferred. While the for-
mer requirement is hard to enforce in real life and we discuss it in
Section 7, we present an algebra that satisfies the latter require-
ment:
L = {0} × {c, r, p}, Σ = L ∪ {(0, ε)} ∪ Z
+
× {b, bc},
W = N× {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
 is s. t. W is lexicographically ordered based on the order ≤, ⊕
is defined as
⊕ (0, c) (0, r) (0, p) (x, b) (x, bc)
(0, c) (0, c) (1, bc) (1, bc) (x, bc) (x, bc)
(0, r) (0, r) (1, b) (1, b) (x + 1, b) (x + 1, b)
(0, p) (0, p) (0, p) (0, p) (x, b) (x + 1, b)
where left column represents labels and the first row represents sig-
natures (the column for signature (0, ε) is the same as that for sig-
nature (0, c) and is omitted), and f is defined as
f(0, ε) = (0, 0), f(x, c) = (0, 1), f(x, r) = (0, 2),
f(x, p) = (0, 3), f(x, b) = (x, 4), f(x, bc) = (x, 4),
where c, r, and p represent customer, peer, and provider links re-
spectively, ε is the signature of any trivial path as in algebras de-
scribed in Section 3.1.2, b represents a backup path that begins
with a peer or provider link, and bc a backup path that begins with
a customer link. The first component of labels and signatures x
represents the number of steps and valleys together that path con-
tains. Both valleys and steps are allowed in this algebra, but backup
paths have the least preference. For any two backup paths this al-
gebra breaks ties by picking the one with less steps and valleys. It
is easy to check that this algebra is monotonic, and, therefore, de-
scribes a path vector protocol that is guaranteed to converge. The
lexicographic order f(0, c) < f(0, r) < f(0, p) < f(x, b) =
f(x, bc) < +∞ for any x, implies that this algebra satisfies the
first property of policy-based routing but that it does not satisfy all
the other properties because it allows for backup paths (see Table
1). We see that a real-life BGP implementation of this algebra re-
quires that extensions of provider paths to valleys and extensions
of peer, customer, and provider paths to steps are recorded together
with general route advertisements as part of the protocol so that
nodes who obtain such advertisements can have a separate tables
for backup paths ranked by the number of steps and valleys adver-
tised paths contain from least to most. In Section 4 we describe
an extension that implements this algebra on top of a secure BGP
protocol [12] .
4. PROTOCOL
One bit, or a flag, for each new AS in the path is enough to
prevent policy attacks described above. The key is to mark the ad-
vertisements as leaving towards a peer or towards a customer, thus
allowing the subsequent receivers of the advertisement to check if
the advertisement is following a valid path.
When an update is sent perform the following actions:
• When an update is sent to a provider - do nothing.
• When an update is sent to a peer - add a flag.
• When an update is sent to a customer - add a flag.
do nothing here means the default action where no flags are added
but the update is sent.
When an update is received preform the following actions:
• When an update is received from a provider - perform default
update processing.
• When an update is received from a customer, check if it is
flagged. If yes, mark the path as invalid and use it for routing
decision only if no other paths are available. Even if no other
paths are available, do not forward the advertisement. If the
update is not flagged, perform default update processing.
• When an update is received from a peer, check if it has been
flagged by an AS that is not an immediate peer. If yes, mark
the path as invalid and use it for routing devision only if no
other paths are available. Even if no other paths are available,
do not forward the advertisement. If no such flag is in the
update, then perform default update processing.
The processing is most intricate when an update is received from
a peer, because peers, according to a protocol, set the flags. Only
Figure 5: Policy attack prevention flag format. The entry is
part of Route Attestation message in ATTEST BGP attribute.
when peer is forwarding an update that already has a flag is the
peer considered to be in violation of the proposed protocol and the
update is marked as invalid.
The flag, or rather a bit indicating the status of an update, needs
to be included in the signed portion of the Secure BGP message.
For each AS, the update traverses Secure BGP and adds a new op-
tional, transitive path attribute called ATTEST. The ATTEST at-
tribute must contain Route Attestation (RA) and may contain Ad-
dress Attestation (AA). We propose to introduce part code 6 (0110)
to ATTEST attribute that follows the format presented in Figure 5.
Note that absence of such part in ATTEST attribute indicates that
the AS did not flag the announcement. While, technically, we use
more than one bit, in principle we could use only a single bit, but
then we would break the backwards compatibility of Secure BGP
protocol.
5. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effect of incremental deployment
of our scheme on an Internet topology. We use a snapshot of the pri-
mary AS topology [1, 4] in our experiments. We first observe how
vulnerable the Internet is to traffic hijacking and then show how
useful an incremental implementation in reducing these attacks.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We wrote a simulator in Python for all our experiments. For
reasons of scale, we use a snapshot from January 1998. We believe
that this is representative and that the results are valid in today’s
Internet. Future experiments on later graphs are planned in order to
confirm this hypothesis. A customer is any AS that has a customer
relationship with any other AS. A provider is any AS that has a
provider relationship with at least one other AS. In our experiments,
we only look for the valley-path vulnerability, so any AS that has
more than one provider is potential attacker. A vulnerable host is
any AS that has a provider relationship with at least one potential
attacker. Our threat model is explained in more detail in Section 2.
5.2 Results
Table 3 shows how vulnerable the Internet is to traffic hijacking
even when we consider only valley-free property violations (not
step violations). Notice that there are 694 providers in the Inter-
net, and 520 of them (75%) are vulnerable to having their traffic
hijacked. Of the customers, about 1433 (44%) are potential hijack-
ers.
Number of providers 694
Number of customers 3235
Number of vulnerable providers 520
Number of potential attackers 1433
Table 3: Characteristics of the Topology used
Figure 6 shows how random deployment of our scheme reduces
the number of vulnerable paths. By random deployment, we mean
that a certain fraction of ASes was selected (one-by-one indepen-
dently and without replacement) to deploy our scheme uniformly
over the whole set of ASes. The total number of paths is all paths
between a source-destination pair of providers. We use Gao’s algo-
rithm [8] to calculate the shortest valley-free path between all such
source-destination pairs. A vulnerable path is one that traverses two
vulnerable hosts. With random deployment, the curve starts going
down sharply (i.e, we see benefit) when more than about 60% of
providers deploy the scheme. This is because unless an AS with
large out-degree does not deploy, effect is minimal. The error bars
are significant because we take only 10 sample points for each trial
due to the time required to run the simulation, and the out-degree of
ASes are highly skewed. Thus, benefit of deploying our scheme for
the entire network is significantly reduced if a very small number
(< 1%) of the highly connected ASes do not deploy.
Figure 6: Effect of incremental deployment on vulnerable
paths.
Figure 7 shows how effective the scheme would be if a only
small fraction of the most connected providers adopt our scheme.
Observe that if just 50 providers (7%) with the highest out-degree
implement the scheme, the benefit to the entire network reaches the
same level as that of 70% of random deployment. Thus, for our
protocol to be effective, incremental deployment among the highly
connected provider ASes is the most effictive and requires the least
number of participating ASes. We emphasize that these numbers
are only for valley violations. We expect them to be worse when
we consider step violations. We intend to run experiments with
more trials on newer topologies while considering step violations
in the future.
6. RELATED WORK
In [9] Griffin and Wilfong present a formal model of BGP and
show that static analysis with respect to BGP convergence of poli-
cies that are based on local-preferences and AS–path–length at-
Figure 7: Effect of deployment among highly-connected ASes
on vulnerable paths.
tributes is NP–complete, even when routing policies of each AS
are known. In [10] Griffin and Wilfong present an abstract ver-
sion of BGP where additional information regarding route history
of oscillations is passed together with routing advertisements. The
authors show that by suppressing routes with histories that contain
cycles due to policy conflicts their generalization for BGP is guar-
anteed to converge when no network topology changes take place.
The down side is that both of these works rely on knowledge of the
AS topology and the set of routing policies for each AS. On the
other hand Gao and Rexford propose a set of guidelines that allow
for ASes to set flexible policies, while not requiring coordination
with other ASes, such that route convergence even under changes
in the topology and routing policies is guaranteed [7].
The aforementioned studies do not analyze routing protocols with
backup paths (paths with steps but no valleys) that could be used to
increase the reliability of the network under link and router failures.
In [6] Gao et al. present a general model for backup routing (paths
with steps allowed) that increases network reliability with respect
to link failures while guaranteeing convergence. Sobrinho presents
necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence of path vector
protocols in terms of its algebraic formulation, and constructs al-
gebras for valley-free policy-based routing with local preferences
without and with backup paths [15]. Algebraic analysis of our pro-
tocol is built on these results.
To the best of our knowledge, the only study that discusses the
issue of how policy violations may become security threats in the
context of IP prefix highjacking was presented in [14]. It is shown
in [14] that such attacks can be effective in attracting significant
volumes of traffic, but no approach for resolving them is proposed.
We present a protocol that is an extension of secure BGP for policy
based-routing with local preferences with backup paths that include
valleys and counts the number of vulnerabilities (steps and valleys
that could be used for highjacking). Our protocol does not require
global knowledge of the AS topology and local policies of each AS.
We show that our protocol is guaranteed to converge by checking
that its algebraic formulation satisfies the necessary convergence
property as per [15].
Prefix hijacking using BGP protocols was studied by Ballani et.
al in [3]. The authors outlined possible attacks on BGP protocol
and documented number of prefix hijacking attacks in the Internet.
In [18] Zheng et. al proposed a prefix hijacking detection system
that utilizes multiple vantage points. Hu et. al in [11] described a
different scheme for IP prefix hijacking detection, which involves
both data plane traces from vantage points and an analysis of a BGP
control plane. These works on prefix hijacking do not address the
BGP policy attacks we described in section 2.
7. CONCLUSION
The BGP was not designed with security in mind and is sus-
ceptible to multiple attacks. Holistic security extensions to the
BGP, such as Secure BGP, solve many issues with the protocol
but still leave it vulnerable to policy-based attacks. In this paper,
we characterized three types of major policy attacks and developed
a lightweight and easy-to-implement extension to the Secure BGP
protocol that prevents such attacks. We show that thus-modified Se-
cure BGP protocol is guaranteed to converge even when steps and
valleys are allowed (although greatly discouraged). With experi-
ments over a real network topology, we show that partial deploy-
ment of our scheme can be effective in preventing possible threats
of such attacks; for example, the number of vulnerable paths could
be reduced by approximately 80% if only one hundred largest In-
ternet networks would deploy our scheme.
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